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FRANZ KAFKA, LAWRENCE JOSEPH, 
AND THE POSSIBILITIES OF 
JURISPRUDENTIAL LITERATURE 
PATRICK J. GLEN* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
What does a tubercular Czech Jew, born and raised in Prague, who 
died in June 1924, have in common with a Maronite Catholic of mixed 
Lebanese and Syrian descent, born and raised in Detroit during the 1950s 
and 1960s, and who currently haunts the streets of twenty-first century 
New York City? If the Czech Jew is Franz Kafka and the Maronite 
Detroiter is Lawrence Joseph, there are far more similarities than one may 
expect considering the expanse of time and space separating their lives and 
experiences. 1  Both studied and eventually practiced law: Kafka in the 
context of insurance, employment, and workers compensation, and Joseph 
with the international law firm of Shearman & Sterling.2 Kafka was a short 
story writer and novelist while Joseph is an acclaimed poet and novelist.3 
In both of their literary works, law and legal themes are often at the center 
of their writings. Nonetheless, the writers differ significantly in how they 
depict the law in their works. 
Joseph’s writing on the law, especially his novel and exposé 
Lawyerland, is intimately connected with the practice and experience of 
law in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries.4 Although the 
anecdotes and vignettes presented in Lawyerland draw back the curtain of 
the law and expose it to the light of the non-lawyer world, there is nothing 
inherently bizarre or absurd about the world of Lawyerland. Lawyerland is 
a work of realism, not necessarily nonfiction, as the prefatory reader’s note 
 
*     Adjunct Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Attorney, United 
States Department of Justice. The views and opinions expressed herein do not represent 
those of the federal government or the Department of Justice.  The author would like to 
thank Lawrence Joseph for his gracious and insightful comments on initial drafts of this 
article, and the staff at the Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal for their 
extraordinary work in editing and publishing this piece. 
 1.  For biographical information on Kafka and Joseph, see Patrick J. Glen, The 
Deconstruction and Reification of Law in Franz Kafka’s “Before the Law” and The Trial, 
17 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 23, 27–33 (2007); Lawrence Joseph Faculty Profile, ST. JOHN’S 
UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, http://www.stjohns.edu/academics/graduate/law/faculty/Profiles/Joseph 
(last visited Oct. 10, 2011).  
 2.  See sources cited supra note 1.  
 3.  See sources cited supra note 1. 
 4.  See, e.g., LAWRENCE JOSEPH, LAWYERLAND (1997). 
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makes clear: it is a truthful work, even if not a factual work.5 Clothed in 
this guise, this work has been pivotal—as no review has failed to note—in 
fully understanding the operation, shortcomings, inconsistencies, and 
contradictions of law and its practice in contemporary America. In short, 
Lawyerland is a book that clearly and emphatically takes aim at the law and 
lawyers, even as it disavows any intent to explicate or rationalize what it 
finds. Thus, the law of Lawyerland is a recognizable law, even if this law 
leaves a great deal to be desired. 
The law of Kafka, on the other hand, bears little resemblance to the 
regimented system and practice depicted in Lawyerland. As Judge Richard 
Posner stated, “‘Law’ in Kafka’s fiction is, for the most part, not law as we 
think of it, a system of rules; it is malevolent whimsy.”6 Based on this view 
and interpretation of Kafka’s law, Judge Posner has consistently argued 
that whatever Kafka’s writings might be about, they do not, in any 
meaningful way, engage in questions pertaining to the law or legal themes.7 
Regarding Kafka’s unfinished novel, The Trial, Judge Posner argues that 
the use of law acts only as a frame of reference or symbolic lens through 
which other, more personal, themes may be explored and refracted.8 The 
Trial is not about a trial, nor is it about due process, criminal procedure, or 
 
 5.  Id. at A Note To The Reader.  
 6.  Richard A. Posner, The Ethical Significance of Free Choice: A Reply to Professor 
West, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1431, 1432 n.8 (1986) [hereinafter Posner, A Reply to Professor 
West]. 
 7.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW & LITERATURE (rev. & enlarged ed., 1998) 
[hereinafter POSNER, LAW & LITERATURE]; Posner, A Reply to Professor West, supra note 6; 
Richard A. Posner, Law and Literature: A Relation Reargued, 72 VA. L. REV. 1351 (1986) 
[hereinafter Posner, A Relation Reargued]. 
 8.  See, e.g., POSNER, LAW & LITERATURE, supra note 7, at 134 (“People often think 
that the point of The Trial is how awful it is to be arrested, charged with an unspecified 
offense by a secret court whose inscrutable proceedings tend to drag on interminably, and 
then clandestinely and summarily executed; that in short it is a book about the perversion of 
legal justice. I don’t read it so.”); Posner, A Reply to Professor West, supra note 6, at 1447 
n.42 (“Reading The Trial . . . you cannot believe that the ‘court’—with its rickety tenements, 
erotic overtones, and functionaries with funny clothes—has much to do with government, 
notwithstanding Kafka’s borrowings of many details of Austro-Hungarian criminal 
procedure . . . . [The court] seems nothing so worldly as an organ of state power.”); Posner, 
A Relation Reargued, supra note 7, at 1358 (“Most scholars . . . do not think that the novel’s 
legal aspects have more than a symbolic significance . . . . The literary significance of The 
Trial is unlikely to derive from its descriptions of Austro-Hungarian criminal procedure. 
Very few of Kafka’s readers have any interest in Austro-Hungarian criminal procedure or, 
for that matter, in due process of law (the failure to notify the protagonist of the charge 
against him and to accord him a proper hearing before his execution are, of course, flagrant 
violations of due process . . . .”). 
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law at all; for Judge Posner, “[t]he heart of The Trial lies elsewhere . . . in 
K.’s futile efforts to find a human meaning in a universe, symbolized by the 
court, that has not been created to be accommodating or intelligible to man 
but is arbitrary, impersonal, cruel, deceiving, and elusive.” 9  Likewise, 
Kafka’s famous parable Before the Law is not simply about a man coming 
to find the Law, but about “a universe in which all is unintelligibility, 
dislocatedness, alienation, [and] human isolation.”10 Similarly, In the Penal 
Colony is only ostensibly concerned with the lack of due process and 
execution. 11  The story is not a jurisprudential allegory, but rather is 
concerned with the isolation of the officer in his attempts to bring others 
into line with his view regarding an elaborate mechanized killing machine 
and its benefits.12 Judge Posner’s reading of Kafka’s writings on the law is 
neatly summed up by Robin West, professor of law and philosophy at 
Georgetown Law: “These stories just can’t be telling us something about 
law, because law is a ‘system of rules,’ and what Kafka describes is more 
like ‘malevolent whimsy.’”13 
Judge Posner, of course, is not alone in critiquing the readings of 
Kafka’s work that have focused on the legal themes in those writings to the 
exclusion of other possible interpretations. But his limiting interpretation is 
not the dominant one in academia. Professor West, for instance, has used 
Kafka’s writings to critique Posner’s own economic accounts of law and 
legal institutions.14 Regarding The Trial, Justice Anthony Kennedy of the 
United States Supreme Court stated that it “is actually closer to reality than 
fantasy as far as the client’s perception of the system,” and that “[i]t’s 
supposed to be fantastic allegory, but it’s reality. It’s very important that 
lawyers read it and understand this.”15 
 
 9.  POSNER, LAW & LITERATURE, supra note 7, at 135. 
 10.  Id. at 135–36. 
 11.  Id. at 129. 
 12.  Id. 
 13.  Robin West, Submission, Choice, and Ethics: A Rejoinder to Judge Posner, 99 
HARV. L. REV. 1449, 1452 (1986) (internal citation omitted) [hereinafter West, Submission, 
Choice, and Ethics]. 
 14.  See Robin West, Authority, Autonomy, and Choice: The Role of Consent in the 
Moral and Political Visions of Franz Kafka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 
(1985). 
 15.  Terry Carter, A Justice Who Makes Time to Read, and Thinks All Lawyers Should, 
Too, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., Jan. 26, 1993, at 2. 
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What accounts for these differences of opinion about Kafka’s work? 
Of course, reasonable minds may differ, but is there something more 
fundamental at play that results in a sharp dichotomy being drawn in 
interpretations of Kafka’s writings on the law? First, Judge Posner’s 
interpretations of Kafka often seem incorrect and fail to take into account 
the work as a whole. For instance, his interpretation of the officer’s 
isolation and inability to convince others of his position in In the Penal 
Colony fails to account for what is perhaps the story’s most important 
aspect—the phrase, “Be Just!” that the officer passes on himself.16 Second, 
regardless of whether or not Judge Posner’s interpretations are conceivable 
or permissible, he offers no compelling rationale for limiting the range of 
interpretations of Kafka’s works to nonlegal, philosophical, and 
sociological interpretations. This is especially troubling considering that 
Kafka’s life was spent studying and practicing law. Any attempt to 
minimize the importance of Kafka’s own experiences and background to 
his writing, and to, essentially, ignore the many mentions and depictions of 
law, is nothing other than “reading by political fiat,”17 unsupported by an 
objective engagement with the text. 
Finally, and most importantly in the context of the instant Article, the 
different views of Kafka held by Judge Posner, on the one hand, and Justice 
Kennedy, on the other, are the result of perspectival differences in their 
approach to the texts under review. Judge Posner’s view is academic, 
judicially oriented, and prejudiced at the outset toward a very specific 
understanding of law—law as a well-ordered system of rules, capable of 
operating rationally, efficiently, and justly. His view is from the bench, 
from the interior of a system he has spent the majority of his life acting 
within, and thus gives an interpretation of law as one initiated into its 
mysteries. Most importantly, from this perch, law is something objective 
and definite—not amorphous, mysterious, or absurd. Justice Kennedy is no 
less one of the initiated than Judge Posner, yet his statement clearly evinces 
a perspective distinct from Judge Posner’s—that of the litigant or other 
legal subject. Justice Kennedy’s quote reflects a transference of 
perspective, a disrobing of sorts. By offering this specific view of Kafka, 
Justice Kennedy is not quoted as “Justice Kennedy,” or even as a lawyer, 
but rather as one outside the system desperate to understand and operate 
 
 16.  See FRANZ KAFKA, In the Penal Colony, in THE METAMORPHOSIS, IN THE PENAL 
COLONY, AND OTHER STORIES 191, 219 (Willa Muir & Edwin Muir trans., Shocken Books 
1995) (1948) [hereinafter KAFKA, In the Penal Colony]. 
 17.  West, Submission, Choice, and Ethics, supra note 13, at 1452. 
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within the system of law. His quote arises from the perspective of the man 
from the country, humbly waiting unto death before the Door of the Law,18 
or Joseph K., sitting bewildered in his landlady’s sitting room charged with 
a phantom crime by a mysterious entity.19 Law in this view is subjective, 
superficial, mysterious, arbitrary, and absurd. If there is a system from this 
perspective, it is not ordered, but chaotic. 
The important point here is that the law is the same in either case—it 
is only the view that has changed. The same system manifests itself 
differently when experienced in different veins, whether it is the judge 
interpreting and applying the law, the lawyer arguing the law, or the litigant 
subjected to the law. Judge Posner and Justice Kennedy’s interpretations of 
Kafka are complementary, not contradictory; they represent two sides of 
the same coin. Likewise, Kafka’s writings on the law are complementary to 
Joseph’s writings on the law, specifically, Lawyerland. 20  The starkest 
differences in the way Kafka and Joseph depict the law can be interpreted 
as simply perspectival shifts in the description of the same system. Kafka 
approaches law from the outside looking in, as the anxious litigant bowed 
at the knees before “The Law,” whereas Joseph approaches law from the 
inside, as the lawyers and judges of the court view and experience the law, 
in all its mundane detail. Reading Kafka and Joseph together highlights the 
competing and superficially exclusive characterizations of the law that may 
arise from multiple perspectives of the same context. Thus, where a judge 
or lawyer may not deem law a system of “malevolent whimsy,”21 a litigant 
appearing before that judge very well might see it as such, even though 
there is no objective difference in the law to which they are each referring. 
The difference is one both of experience and perspective. 
The main focus of this Article is to provide a reading of Kafka and 
Joseph that synthesizes their works, culminating in a unitary but multi-
faceted interpretation of law. To this end, Section II addresses Kafka’s 
main writings on the law, including The Trial,22 Before the Law,23 The 
 
 18.  In Before the Law, Kafka uses “the Law” to refer to a place; references in this 
Article to “the Law” with the word law capitalized should be construed accordingly. See 
FRANZ KAFKA, Before the Law, in THE COMPLETE STORIES 3–4 (Nahum N. Glatzer ed., 1946)  
[hereinafter KAFKA, Before the Law]. 
 19.  See generally FRANZ KAFKA, THE TRIAL (Breon Mitchell trans., Shocken Books 
1998) (1925) [hereinafter KAFKA, THE TRIAL]. 
 20.  JOSEPH, supra note 4. 
 21.  Posner, A Reply to Professor West, supra note 6. 
 22.  KAFKA, THE TRIAL, supra note 19. 
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Problem of Our Laws,24 and The Knock at the Manor Gate.25 These texts 
present law as an absurd and shrinking presence, which seems to always be 
something outside the grasp of the litigant. Section III presents Joseph’s 
“truthful novel” Lawyerland and offers a complementary reading of Kafka 
and Joseph. The absurd and shrinking presence of the law in Kafka is given 
form and substance in Joseph; the curtain is drawn back from the shadowy 
and mysterious confines of “the court,” divulging the shifting truth and 
moral ambiguity of “Lawyerland.” Finally, Section IV places this 
interpretation of Kafka and Joseph in the broader context of the law and 
literature movement, and specifically argues that certain literature can 
constitute a coherent jurisprudence. This fact is accentuated by the distance 
between most modern subjects of the law and the judges, courts, and other 
traditional foci of jurisprudential thinking. As experienced law devolves 
ever farther from the heights of the Supreme Court and other high appellate 
courts, it is less obvious that any coherent and traditional jurisprudential 
account of law can be given. It is in this gap that the possibilities of 
jurisprudential literature become most clear as a fictive, but truthful, 
narrative of the law that may come closest to capturing the law’s essence. 
II. IMMANENCE AND ABSENCE IN KAFKA’S WRITINGS ON THE 
LAW 
Franz Kafka died relatively young, leaving behind a correspondingly 
slim body of work.26 Within the texts published both during his lifetime 
and after his death, there are only a handful that directly implicate 
depictions of the law or legal themes, while a second set of writings 
addresses issues tangentially related to the law.27 This Section will examine 
the writings that most clearly raise jurisprudential questions, including 
Kafka’s unfinished novel The Trial, the parable Before the Law, and the 
two short stories The Knock at the Manor Gate and The Problem of Our 
Laws. The depiction of law and the legal system is by no means identical 
across this range of stories or across Kafka’s writings on the law more 
 
 23.  KAFKA, Before the Law, supra note 18. 
 24.  FRANZ KAFKA, The Problem of Our Laws, in THE COMPLETE STORIES 437 (Nahum 
N. Glatzer ed., 1946) [hereinafter KAFKA, Problem of Our Laws]. 
 25.  FRANZ KAFKA, The Knock at the Manor Gate, in THE COMPLETE STORIES 418 
(Nahum N. Glatzer ed., 1946) [hereinafter KAFKA, Knock at the Manor Gate]. 
 26.  Douglas E. Litowitz, Franz Kafka’s Outsider Jurisprudence, 27 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY 103, 115–16 (2002). 
 27.  See Glen, supra note 1, at 33 (listing Kafka’s texts and their relations to the law); 
Litowitz, supra note 26, at 116. 
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generally. Nonetheless, there are characteristics that Kafka’s law can be 
said generally to possess based on a review of these writings, lending 
support to the claim that there is a coherent jurisprudence lurking beneath 
the surface of his fiction. Kafka’s law is portrayed from the outside looking 
in, from the perspective of the anxious litigant either caught in the legal 
system or seeking to gain admission thereto. In the course of the Kafkian 
subject’s interactions with the legal system, the law is most accurately 
characterized as an absence or a fleeting presence. It rarely becomes 
manifest, and those officials and entities connected with the law tend to 
confuse the issue rather than elucidate it. Yet despite this desultory view of 
the law from the litigant’s perspective, there is a striking amount of legal 
practice and action that actually takes place in Kafka’s writing. This action 
is itself fleeting or secretive, however, always happening just out of earshot 
in the room next door. It is this absolute immanence of the law, hiding 
under the surface of Kafka’s writings and just beyond the reach of his 
protagonists, coupled with the experience of absence felt by these litigants, 
that is the main import of his writings on the law. Law can be both 
everywhere and nowhere at the same time; the experience is subjective and 
depends on the positioning of the subject himself. A review of Kafka’s 
texts will make this point more definitively. 
The Trial, published posthumously by Max Brod, Kafka’s friend and 
executor, and Before the Law, a short parable published during Kafka’s 
lifetime and recounted in The Trial, are Kafka’s most famous writings 
depicting the law.28  The protagonist of The Trial, a bank clerk named 
Joseph K., is arrested one morning in his apartment by an unknown 
authority, while the narration intimates that he has done nothing wrong.29 
No charge is leveled against him and the warders and inspector that 
conduct his initial interview hint that they would not be privy to knowledge 
of such a charge even if it had issued.30 Even his arrest seems absurd—
although he is under arrest he is informed by the inspector that he is free to 
go about his life as before.31 K. attempts to do this, but subsequently gets 
pulled further into the orbit of the shadowy “court.” 32  The following 
Sunday, K. attends an interrogation by the court which takes place in a 
 
 28.  See Glen, supra note 1, at 33. 
 29.  KAFKA, THE TRIAL, supra note 19, at 3. 
 30.  Id. at 14. 
 31.  Id. at 16–17. 
 32.  See id. at 20–35. 
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large attic space in a tenement building.33 Before a packed audience and 
after a comical miss-start by the examining magistrate, who asks K. 
whether he is a painter, K. launches into a harangue of the court and its 
officials. 34  During the course of K.’s verbal pyrotechnics, half of the 
audience seems to be warming to his theme,35 but when he subsequently 
jumps from the podium to come to the aid of an accosted woman at the 
back of the hall, he realizes that the entire audience is composed of court 
officials and that presumably the crowd behind him was placed there 
simply to goad him on.36 
K. returns to the “courtroom” the following week, despite not being 
ordered to appear, only to find the hall empty. 37  He strikes up a 
conversation with the wife of an usher of the court who permits him to 
enter the hall and examine the papers on the examining magistrate’s desk—
an obscene drawing and an erotic novel.38 It is then that the woman is again 
accosted by a law student, the same individual who had grabbed her the 
preceding week, and is carried away up the stairs of the tenement to the 
examining magistrate. 39  The woman’s husband returns home from an 
errand and offers to take K. on a tour of the court’s offices, which occupy 
the attics of that same tenement.40 After a respiratory attack, brought on by 
the confined space and dingy air of the offices, K. manages to leave the 
tenement and vows never to return to that courtroom.41 
Several increasingly absurd scenes follow. One night at the bank, 
upon hearing sighs coming from behind the door of what he believed to be 
a utility closet, K. finds the two warders who initially informed him of his 
arrest being whipped by a man in a black mask—a “whipper” of the 
court.42 Their punishment followed K.’s accusations against them during 
his speech at the courtroom.43 K. hurriedly closes the closet door when one 
lets out a shriek upon being whipped, but the following night he finds the 
 
 33.  Id. at 35, 38–39. 
 34.  Id. at 44–51. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. at 51–53. 
 37.  Id. at 54. 
 38.  Id. at 54–61. 
 39.  Id. at 61–65. 
 40.  Id. at 65, 68. 
 41.  Id. at 71–79. 
 42.  Id. at 80–81. 
 43.  Id. at 81. 
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exact same scene—the two warders in the closet with the whipper poised 
above them. 44  K. also is led to the unofficial “official” court painter, 
Titorelli, who lives in a cramped attic studio and is perpetually plagued by 
a group of girls who also belong to the court.45 It is from Titorelli that K. 
learns a definite acquittal is impossible: his only options are an indefinite 
postponement of any verdict by constant filing of documents, or a 
procedural maneuver whereby the charges against him will be ostensibly 
dropped but always subject to reinstatement upon the whim of any official 
who comes into contact with his papers.46 During this time, K.’s uncle, who 
has learned of his predicament through his daughter, also comes to see K. 
and travels with him to see Huld, an attorney of the court and an old friend 
of the uncle’s.47 While visiting this attorney, the pair comes into contact 
with the chief clerk of the court who is hiding in the corner of the lawyer’s 
bedroom when they arrive.48 Any advantage this meeting could bring is 
ended when K. exits the room and begins a sexual liaison with Huld’s 
domestic help.49 At a subsequent meeting, unhappy with the course of his 
proceeding, Huld is fired by K., but only after the lawyer humiliates 
another client in front of him by hinting that the man’s case has not even 
officially begun despite five years’ time and the exhaustion of the man’s 
fortune.50 
In the penultimate chapter of The Trial, K. agrees to accompany an 
Italian client of the bank to the city’s cathedral to view the artwork 
contained therein—a ruse by the court to put K. into contact with the 
court’s priest.51 When K. expresses his belief that he can trust the priest and 
speak openly with him, a rare trait among those officials he has 
encountered, the priest tells K. that he is deluded and then recounts the 
parable Before the Law.52 In the parable, a man from the country comes to 
the door of the Law, which as the story goes, always stands open. 53 
Arriving at the door, however, the man encounters a doorkeeper who 
 
 44.  Id. at 84, 86–87. 
 45.  Id. at 139–47. 
 46.  Id. at 152–62. 
 47.  Id. at 88, 95–97. 
 48.  Id. at 102–04. 
 49.  Id. at 104–10. 
 50.  Id. at 166–98. 
 51.  Id. at 199–212. 
 52.  Id. at 212–17. 
 53.  Id. at 215. 
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denies him immediate entrance, hints that the man may be able to enter at a 
later time, and then stands aside giving the man free rein to enter despite 
the ostensible prohibition.54 The man declines to do this after being told by 
the doorkeeper that there are subsequent doors, guarded by successive 
doorkeepers, each of whose visage is more horrible than the preceding.55 
Rather, the man accepts a stool proffered by the doorkeeper and takes a 
seat beside the open door.56 Here, he passes the years of his life, attempting 
in every manner possible to gain entrance to the Law, but always being 
denied admission by the doorkeeper.57 Finally, as the man from the country 
approaches death and sees a radiance streaming from the interior of the 
Law, he asks the doorkeeper why, in all the years, while he has been 
waiting here no other person has come to the door.58 Bending close to the 
man from the country, the doorkeeper answers, “No one else could ever be 
admitted here, since this gate was made only for you. I am now going to 
shut it.”59 After debating the meaning of this parable and failing to reach 
any satisfactory interpretation of the story, K. leaves the priest and the 
cathedral behind.60 
The ultimate chapter takes place nearly one year to the day after K.’s 
arrest by the court. 61  K. is taken from his apartment by two men, 
executioners associated with the court, and led through the city to a stone 
quarry on its outskirts.62 There, K. is stripped of his shirt and set against a 
large rock as his companions begin to pass a long, double-edged knife 
between them with “nauseating courtesies.”63 The failings of the preceding 
year pass through K.’s head—untried procedures, possibilities that had not 
been pursued, and his inability to penetrate the court or even encounter a 
judge—as the knife is finally plunged into his breast.64 And with his dying 
breath, K. cries: “‘Like a dog!’ . . . as if the shame of it must outlive him.”65 
 
 54.  Id. 
 55.  Id. at 215–16. 
 56.  Id. at 216. 
 57.  Id.  
 58.  Id. at 216–17. 
 59.  Id. at 217. 
 60.  Id. at 217–24. 
 61.  Id. at 225. 
 62.  Id. at 225–29. 
 63.  Id. at 230. 
 64.  Id. at 230–31. 
 65.  Id. at 231. 
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The immediate experience of law in these two stories is one of 
absence. The man from the country wastes his life sitting before the door of 
the Law, dying without gaining admission.66 K. is never told why or with 
what he has been charged, is never granted a proceeding before a judge, is 
not offered a realistic opportunity to defend himself, and is eventually 
executed without even a modicum of due process. 67  Despite being 
ostensibly concerned with the law, in both of these stories the law—aptly 
termed “The Law”— is absent and outside the reach of the protagonists. 
Yet despite this experience of absence suffered by K. and the man from the 
country, beneath the surface of both of these stories there is a tremendous 
amount of activity occurring that implicates the law and legal system. Law 
is an absence for K. and the man from the country, but law is most certainly 
not absent from these stories. 
In Before the Law, the man does see the radiance streaming from 
behind the door shortly before his death, indicating that whatever form the 
interior of the Law may take, there actually is an interior—something 
behind the door that the man could have reached.68 The doorkeeper himself 
offers a concededly bare description of the interior, where successive doors 
open onto successive expanses of the Law, each guarded by a doorkeeper.69 
The law may be an absence in the man’s experience, but it does, in fact, 
exist. 
Likewise, in The Trial, some incident, real or imagined, sets in motion 
the processes of the court. These processes include the initial charge, the 
arrest, the interrogation, the meeting with the priest, and ultimately the 
execution. Presumably, each is also accompanied with debate and dialogue 
between those officials concerned. Kafka continually hints at these 
conversations and the internal machinations of the legal system, lending 
them concreteness in the context of the narrative, even as the law remains 
an absence in K.’s specific experience. The usher’s wife notes how the 
examining magistrate writes late into the night concerning cases and how 
the assembly before which K. was initially interrogated became 
extraordinarily animated following his abrupt departure.70 Frau Grubach 
attempts to alleviate K.’s anxiety the evening of his arrest by telling him 
 
 66.  Id. at 215–17. 
 67.  See generally id. at 3–231. 
 68.  Id. at 216. 
 69.  Id. at 215–16. 
 70.  Id. at 53, 59–60. 
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that from her conversations with the warders, the charge did not seem 
particularly serious.71 The law student bitterly remarks that K. should have 
been detained pending his proceeding, as he had urged, rather than left free, 
indicating some significant debate prior to the arrest as to whether a 
defendant should be detained or remain free despite the arrest. 72  The 
lawyer, Huld, indicates that he is aware of K.’s case, perhaps in some 
detail, and was actually discussing it with the court’s chief clerk prior to 
their initial consultation.73 Even Leni, K.’s mistress, gains certain important 
information about his case to which K. never becomes privy.74 It is not that 
there is no law or process in K.’s case, it is simply that all relevant 
discussions are taking place out of his presence and earshot; in a sense, 
always in the room next door or beyond that one lead he failed to pursue. 
This is further bolstered by the fact that there are a staggering number of 
individuals who seem to be aware of the charge and nature of the case 
against K., from his cousin and uncle, to the tradesman, to the 
manufacturer, the employees at the bank, and the painter. K. may not be 
informed, but he seems to be the only uninformed individual in all of The 
Trial. 
These conversations about the law, and relationships with the law, 
take place within an extensively described system of law. The law is 
multilayered and hierarchical, indicating some process of appeal from 
initial determinations of guilt. The process of determining guilt is based on 
an initial charge, successive interrogations, and some final verdict, after 
which punishment will be exacted. The court even has some mechanism in 
place to train lawyers, apparently an apprenticeship, as the existence of the 
law student and his mentor make clear. Staffing these various levels of the 
court’s bureaucracy are a dizzying array of officials and administrators, 
including priests, executioners, warders, whippers, low officials, clerks, 
ushers, investigators, examining magistrates, and judges. Recognizing its 
own opaque nature, the court ironically possesses even an “information 
officer” to provide information, because the “judicial system is not very 
well known among the general population.”75 
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Thus, it is not the absence of law that is so striking about The Trial, 
but how much law there actually is when one glances just beneath the 
surface of the narrative. This absence is perspectival and arises on account 
of the orientation of the story. Seeing everything from K.’s perspective, one 
is immediately struck by how little of the law actually comes into play in 
determining his case. Yet seen from a different angle, even one as 
innocuous as Leni’s, the picture might look significantly different. There 
may be very simple reasons why K. was charged and arrested. There may 
be simple explanations for the court’s most egregious actions. What stems 
this possibility of truth is not the nature of the court itself or the pettiness of 
its officials, but K.’s failure to penetrate the law—to enter its door. Without 
this entrance, one is left wanting for an objective assessment of the 
authority that ultimately takes K.’s life. 
Another Kafka short story, The Knock at the Manor Gate, presents a 
similar depiction of law and authority as The Trial and Before the Law. In 
The Knock at the Manor Gate, a brother narrates a story concerning a walk 
that he and his sister took one day in the country.76 During the course of 
their walk, the pair passes a large manor house where the sister may or may 
not have knocked at the gate; the text is ambiguous on this point. 77 
Nonetheless, the brother and sister continue walking into the local village 
where they immediately notice the villagers coming out of their houses to 
warn the pair that they will be charged and interrogated, although their 
crime is not made clear.78 The sister becomes worried, but the brother 
remains calm, neither having an idea as to what they might have done to 
cause offense or lead to an investigation.79 The narrative climate shifts, 
however, when they turn to see horsemen riding into the complex of the 
manor house, then back out again in the direction of the village.80 At this 
point, the brother sends his sister on and when the armed horsemen reach 
him, the brother is “asked” to enter a farmhouse.81 His nonchalance quickly 
vanishes: 
I still half believed that a word would be enough to free me, a city man, and 
with honor too, from this peasant folk. But when I had stepped over the 
threshold of the parlor the judge, who had hastened in front and was already 
 
 76.  See KAFKA, Knock at the Manor Gate, supra note 25, at 418–19. 
 77.  Id. at 418. 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  Id. 
 80.  Id. 
 81.  Id. at 418–19. 
60 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 21:47 
 
awaiting me, said: “I’m really sorry for this man.” And it was beyond all 
possibility of doubt that by this he did not mean my present state, but 
something that was to happen to me.82 
Kafka describes the parlor in stark terms, bringing to mind a cell of 
some sort—there is an iron ring on the wall, possibly for shackles, a pallet 
and table in the middle of the room, and a cold, flagstone floor.83 The 
brother recounts nothing further, as the conclusion of the story abruptly 
shifts focus to the present and the rhetorical question: “Could I still endure 
any other air than prison air? That is the great question, or rather it would 
be if I still had any prospect of release.”84 
The immediate experience of the law in The Knock at the Manor Gate 
is again one of absence. It is not clear, for instance, what the nature of the 
manor’s authority is in the region or by what rights it exercises that 
authority. The charge against the brother and, ostensibly, the sister is never 
made clear; it might be the knock at the gate or it might be some other real 
or imagined transgression. The process, if any, afforded the brother is also 
left unstated, and it is not clear whether he himself has ever been apprised 
of the reasons for his incarceration. The sharp jump in the narrative to the 
present lends support to a reading whereby the man is never given notice of 
the charges nor an opportunity to defend himself, and is simply held 
indefinitely on a phantom charge. 
Yet as with both The Trial and Before the Law, there is an underlying 
reality to the situation that is obscured by the brother’s perspective. 
Something happened which constituted a transgression of a law or norm. 
This is made clear not only by the fact that the armed horsemen are called 
for and sent after the pair, but by the initial gesticulations of the townsfolk 
after the couple entered the village.85 The brother may be ignorant of what 
has occurred, but the villagers are clearly aware that something has 
happened that will lead to some sort of investigation.86  This is further 
bolstered by the judge’s statement upon entering the parlor.87 The judge is 
well aware of the transgression, as well as the consequences attendant upon 
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that transgression.88 Finally, there must be some basis for the continued 
confinement of the brother, either some process that unfolded in the parlor 
or some decision made by the manor or an official associated therewith.89 
Thus, while the charge, process, and authority at issue in this story are left 
deliberately obscure on account of the narrative perspective in which the 
events unfold, a whole world lurks just beneath the superficial surface that 
the brother’s narrative recounts. It is his perspective that limits the account, 
not necessarily any shortcomings of the system. 
The unknowability of law reaches its apogee in Kafka in The Problem 
of Our Laws.90 In a fictional country, the laws are unknown to the populace 
at large and are known only to those who are charged with administering 
them—the nobility.91 This state of affairs does not necessarily raise any 
issues of due process or fundamental fairness, as the laws are 
“scrupulously” administered and the interpretations of those laws have 
themselves become canonical.92 The problem lies not in the application or 
interpretation of this unknown body of law, but rather solely in the fact that 
the populace does not know the laws, for “it is an extremely painful thing 
to be ruled by laws that one does not know.” 93  Although the exact 
parameters of the law remain a mystery to the populace, it has been 
deduced in broad form by successive generations of commentators who 
have observed and recorded the actions of the nobility.94 Others, however, 
hold that there is no body of law as such, but that the “[l]aw is whatever the 
nobles do.”95 In any event, many more years or centuries of observation 
will be necessary in order to fully deduce the law.96 At the time when the 
law is fully understood, it will then belong to the populace and not solely 
the nobility.97 For the moment, though, only the nobility and its inherent 
authority can be said to exist for sure.98 
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In this story, the law is absent in one explicit sense and potentially 
absent in another, more profound, way. First, the populace does not know 
the law, and thus does not enter into its experience or interpretation.99 
Second, according to some, there may be no law at all, just the unfettered 
discretion and actions of the nobility.100 This second conception of the 
absence of law cannot easily be reconciled with the rest of the story. It is 
averred that the laws are scrupulously administered, lending support to the 
conclusion that the nobility, whatever else it may do, operates within 
certain bounds.101 Further, over the course of centuries, broad outlines of 
the law have been discerned by members of the populace indicating that 
there is some framework of rules within which the actions of the nobility 
and, by extension, the populace at large must take place.102 
Even discounting the assertion that the law is simply the actions of the 
nobility, there is still a perspectival absence at issue in The Problem of Our 
Laws. It is an absence not identical to the preceding stories, as the absence 
itself does not contribute to violations of due process or absurd 
consequences. In fact, Kafka makes clear that the laws are scrupulously 
applied by the nobility, even if the laws were established to safeguard the 
nobility’s own interests, and that there is little leeway for interpretation left 
in the application of the laws. 103  Thus, the harm to the populace is 
conceived of not as an active sort of harm, but in the style of a benevolent 
paternalism; it is the lack of knowledge itself that is the harm rather than 
any consequences that stem from that lack. The narrator-citizen’s dismay in 
being ruled by a definite, though unknown, law is neatly echoed by Judge 
Learned Hand: “For myself it would be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy 
of Platonic Guardians.” 104  Despite this dismay and the initial lack of 
knowledge concerning the law, the population is moving towards a greater 
understanding of the law—something that does not occur in the preceding 
stories. From a perspective outside the law, and beginning with no 
knowledge of its interior, the populace has, over the course of time, begun 
to piece together the nature of the law that governs them by observing the 
actions of the authority in every possible circumstance.105 This period of 
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observation must inevitably continue, as new situations will arise where 
knowledge of what has occurred before may not be of assistance in 
determining how the nobility will react. Nonetheless, inevitably the 
populace will continually make progress in developing a fuller 
understanding of the law and thus will enter into its shared experience with 
the nobility. Accordingly, not only does there appear to be an objective law 
underneath the surface of this story, but also the conclusion is hopeful that 
the law will eventually become intelligible to those it is instituted to 
govern. 
Pieced together from the separate fabric of these stories, Kafka’s 
jurisprudence seems empty. The protagonists of his stories have no real 
experience or engagement with the law; the citizens of The Problem of Our 
Laws come closest to engaging with the law, but even their experiences are 
based on conjecture and observation, not direct communion with the 
system. Yet even as law is manifest as absence for the Kafkian litigant, 
there is law in all of these stories, sometimes more, other times less 
sketched and defined. The citizens in The Problem of Our Laws have the 
broad outlines of the rules that govern them, and expect to come closer and 
closer to the truth of the law as the years pass. The law exists for the man 
from the country, streaming radiantly from its sanctuary, even as he 
remains outside its purview. In The Trial, K. is charged, investigated, and 
executed based on the invocation of some law and the judgment of some 
legal system. There must be some rationale behind the anxiety of the 
villagers in The Knock at the Manor Gate and the brother’s eventual 
indefinite detention. 
The disconnect between the law as experienced by the protagonist and 
the law’s apparent objective and mundane existence is at the heart of the 
question of Kafka’s jurisprudence. This question begins as a “why”: Why 
are the apparent subjects of the law kept outside its purview? Why is the 
man from the country never admitted to the law, or why is the brother 
never apprised of the charges against him nor provided with an opportunity 
to defend himself? For what reasons are the laws kept from the populace? 
Why is K. not provided with answers regarding the charge against him and 
his inquiries concerning the court? Behind every fantastical answer to these 
questions lies an ordinary response. A procedural rule may not have been 
followed correctly or the terms of legal invocation may have otherwise 
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been jumbled.106 In Before the Law, perhaps the man from the country 
misunderstood his rights at the door of the Law and sat idly by when he 
could have taken what he wanted. In K.’s case, the law may have been 
found behind one more door, perhaps before the phantom judge and 
courtroom he imagines at the point of his execution.107 The law may not 
have retreated before K.’s advances, but simply been one step beyond the 
point he was able to reach. And, of course, K. and the brother in The Knock 
at the Manor Gate may have actually been guilty of something and justly 
punished—the absence of an explanation in the narratives does not 
foreclose this possibility. 
These are all potential answers to the question of why the law is kept 
remote from the Kafkian subject, but they represent only conjecture or 
possible interpretations. The fact is that any answer to the question of 
“why” hides behind the same door that keeps the law concealed. There is 
no answer within the texts because an answer would itself betray the vision 
of law that Kafka presents. Kafka’s jurisprudence, written from the 
perspective of the anxious litigant, unassuming villager, and ordinary 
citizen, is defined by its alienation of the subject. The law does possess an 
objective reality, and may very well be highly systematized and 
scrupulously applied, but it is a law that never truly embraces those brought 
before it. If this is the case, Kafka cannot give any definitive answer to the 
questions of “why” raised by these stories, as the response would draw 
back the curtain and reveal the ordinary machinery propelling the narrative. 
While the curtain remains drawn, he can, however, provide hints of what 
lies just beyond the edge of the story. Yet even with the curtain drawn, one 
may be able to sneak backstage and steal a glance at the narrative engine; it 
is this idea that provides a segue from Kafka to the late twentieth century 
world of Lawrence Joseph and Lawyerland. 
III. KAFKA IN LAWYERLAND 
Whereas one has to chase Kafka’s law down an endlessly multiplying 
series of dim corridors, the law in Lawyerland pulses from the very first 
page and quickens in cadence as the book builds towards its abrupt and, for 
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a non-lawyer, absurd conclusion. But what is Lawyerland? It is a fictive 
piece of nonfiction, or, as more elegantly worded in Joseph’s introduction: 
[Lawyerland] is a work of nonfiction. It consists of exchanges among 
lawyers about law and lawyers, and, in many instances, the names, 
circumstances, and characteristics of the persons and places portrayed have 
been changed . . . . Lawyerland is truthful rather than factual, but solidly 
based on facts. There was no other way to write it. Those readers who are 
also lawyers will especially appreciate why.108 
The question of whether the book is nonfiction or fiction is unimportant in 
the context of Joseph’s assertion that it is truthful—truthful in its depiction 
of the legal system, the process of law, and the character of those disparate 
individuals who engage in the practice of law. The assertion of truthfulness 
perhaps gets one closer to the reality of the matter in any event, as any 
lawyer knows that facts often conceal an underlying truth. 
Lawyerland’s truthfulness unfolds as interviews with lawyers in New 
York City, some whom the interviewer knows personally, and some to 
whom he has been directed by associates. 109  This frame of reference 
provides the counterpoint to Kafka’s depiction of the law. The law is no 
longer experienced by the litigant—the outsider seeking answers or 
vindication of his rights—but by those who operate within its authority. 
Lawyerland is a book about law from the perspective of the law and 
lawyers. It is a glimpse into the room next door, or behind the curtain, and 
thus serves to elucidate the processes Kafka buries under the superficial 
absurdity of his writings. Nonetheless, readers opening Lawyerland in 
order to find a clear explication of what the law is, how it develops, how 
and why it is applied in certain circumstances, or any other permutation of 
these questions, will be sorely disappointed. There is no lucid description 
of the law in general or in the specific situations within which the lawyers 
of Lawyerland operate. This fact is one of the most important aspects of 
Lawyerland as it points to the same disconnect between The Law and the 
practice and experience of law that Kafka explores in his writings. It is 
perspective again that becomes of the utmost importance, but the 
perspective of the reader has shifted by moving from Kafka to Joseph. 
In the opening interview of Lawyerland the reader is introduced to 
Robinson, a vulgar, fast-talking criminal defense attorney who has viewed 
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the criminal justice system from both sides of the table.110 He recounts his 
defense of a young man, the son of immigrants, who had decided to 
commit burglary.111 The main problem was that the apartment he decided 
to burglarize belonged to an Assistant United States Attorney (“AUSA”).112 
The AUSA hears the sounds of someone attempting to break in through the 
window, takes his wife from the room with instructions to get the baby and 
go into the hall, and waits for the burglar by the window with a handgun.113 
When the young man finally comes through the window, the AUSA is 
ready, grabs him by the head, and beats it against the wall several times.114 
Finally, the AUSA has the young man arrested. 115  The young man’s 
misfortune of burglarizing the apartment of a federal prosecutor is, 
however, unfortunately compounded by the fact that the AUSA’s brother-
in-law is an Assistant District Attorney (“ADA”) at the Manhattan District 
Attorney’s office.116 The ADA has the case assigned to one of the best 
prosecutors in the office, a woman “who’s better-looking and more 
charming than the best of the male peacock jury ass-kissers, and twice as 
smart. One formidable lawyer who very well knows how to use everything 
to her advantage.”117 This prosecutor throws the proverbial book at the 
would-be burglar: “Attempted murder in the second degree, attempted 
robbery in the first degree, reckless-fucking-endangerment in the first 
degree, burglary in the first degree, criminal trespass in the first degree. 
Plus—I can’t even remember them all—a slew of boilerplate offenses for 
concealing a deadly weapon.” 118  Robinson gets the case and wants to 
plead, but the prosecutor makes clear that she is going to take it to trial on 
the lodged counts.119 The case gets assigned to a trial judge who, it turns 
out, knows both the prosecuting ADA as well as the AUSA “victim.”120 
Rather than pursue the case in court, Robinson utilizes this information.121 
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In his own discreet way, he passes it through various circles that he knows 
about the relationships between the prosecutors, the victim, and the judge, 
and that he will not be afraid to be more vocal regarding this 
information.122 The young man is sprung after nearly a year in Riker’s 
Island jail, but Joseph never states whether charges were actually brought, 
whether he was convicted and served this year pursuant to a sentence, or 
whether he was simply released without any charges ever having been 
filed.123 
As presented by Robinson, there is very little that is surprising about 
this story. The laundry-list version of the charges against the burglar, 
although certainly out of the ordinary in cases with similar substantive 
facts, is directly attributable to his misfortune of choosing the wrong 
apartment to burglarize. Both the prosecutors and Robinson have no 
illusions on this point. The decision by the prosecutor to pursue this case to 
trial rather than plead is also a result of the existing relationships between 
the various prosecuting parties and the AUSA. The assignment of the case 
to a judge who knows all of the parties at the prosecutor’s table may elicit a 
groan, but it is not surprising considering the young man’s string of luck. 
The burglar is ultimately released, apparently with no charges filed, but this 
is a function of Robinson’s ability to move within the system, not a 
function of the law taking its general course through the courts. There are 
problems, to be sure, with the foregoing depiction of the legal system, but 
there is nothing odd or mysterious about it, even if much depended on 
chance and misfortune. 
Yet to say there is nothing odd about this story is to miss the question 
of how it implicates the law. Where is the law in the unfolding of 
Robinson’s dilemma? The legal actors are clear enough—the prosecutors in 
the District Attorney’s office, Robinson as defense counsel, and the judge. 
The victim is clear as well, although he is not presented in an overly 
sympathetic light. The criminal violation is not left to doubt, as the young 
man did attempt to burglarize an apartment. The charges against the youth 
are also based on New York state law, even if the actual statutory 
provisions are not cited or mentioned. The law and the legal system 
pervade Robinson’s recounting of this story, but curiously have little to do 
with its course. The charges, even if one or two may have been valid as a 
legal matter, stem from the relationships between the victim and the 
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prosecuting attorneys, not from a fair reading of the underlying facts of the 
case. The decision to proceed to trial is also influenced by these 
relationships, not because of any compelling facts or circumstances that 
make this burglary “worthy” of a court date. Even the ultimate disposition 
of the case, the young man’s freedom, occurs as a result of the interaction 
of certain relationships. Robinson clearly knows and understands the web 
of connections that link the AUSA-victim to the prosecuting attorney and 
the trial judge to both; and Robinson can make this information generally 
known. The burglar presumably obtains his freedom in reaction to this 
implicit threat, not by a judgment of any court or legal official. Law, in the 
case of this burglar, is nothing more than the prism through which these 
various relationships are reflected. The burglar is charged in the way he is 
because of these relationships—he fails to obtain a plea only because of 
these relationships, and he is ultimately freed based on these relationships 
and his attorney’s ability to operate within the system of relationships. The 
law is a passive presence, even as it ostensibly takes center stage. 
Even if the law is, in some sense, at work in this story, how does the 
whole experience look from the perspective of the youth, a really dumb kid 
who can only offer grunts in response to Robinson’s questions?124 In the 
process of breaking into an apartment, but without even setting two feet 
into the room, much less taking anything, he is beaten, and taken into 
custody.125 He is detained for a period of nearly a year with a lengthy list of 
charges pending against him.126  Most of the charges, even if colorable 
under the relevant statutory provisions, seem at the least a stretch on the 
underlying facts. And he is ultimately released from jail having never been 
before a court and having never had an adjudication of his guilt.127 It is 
hard to believe that he would look back on his experience and characterize 
the law as Judge Posner’s system of rules rather than concur with Justice 
Kennedy’s assertion that Kafka’s depiction of the law is far closer to the 
truth for the litigant.128 
This opening vignette gives flesh to the statement by a subsequent 
interviewee, Federal District Court Judge Celia Day, that the “real power 
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exists outside the courts.” 129  Judge Day’s observation fits the main 
component of Kafka’s own jurisprudence, that the relevant action in 
Kafka’s writings on the law is always taking place just out of sight, in that 
next room that seems just beyond reach. In Robinson’s story, the charges 
are levied via a secretive collaboration amongst the burglary victim, the 
brother-in-law, and the prosecutor, which occurs outside the confines of the 
law. Likewise, it is Robinson’s maneuvering in the law’s various social 
spaces that ultimately secures his client’s release. The general prescription 
to look outside the law for its authority, as well as Robinson’s own 
maneuverings within the law, are not unlike what occurs in The Trial, 
where K. is told to play a similar role. K. seeks answers in the places one 
would least likely associate with authority within the court—Titorelli, the 
painter; Leni, K.’s mistress and Huld’s maid; Block, the tradesman; the 
lowly usher; and the usher’s wife. It is by the exploitation of these various 
relationships that K. hopes to gain knowledge of his own case, and perhaps 
even obtain his exoneration. It also does not require a stretch of the 
imagination to superimpose the backroom facts of Robinson’s story onto 
K.’s own experiences within the law. K. is never apprised of the charges 
against him—perhaps they are the product of a personal vendetta, or 
overblown in the same manner that the young burglar’s charges proved to 
be. His execution ultimately may have been on account of his failure to 
exploit the various relationships he made during the course of his 
proceedings, more than any failure to prosecute his case or marshal the 
evidence. Perhaps if he had obtained the services of a Robinson, rather than 
a Huld, he would have penetrated to that final room where his fate hung in 
the balance. As it stands, however, K.’s failure and the course of his 
proceedings can be rationalized to a high degree based on the parallel 
experiences of Robinson and his unfortunate client. 
Whereas one is left to guess at what is happening behind Kafka’s 
closed doors, Joseph transports the reader to exactly that locale. The 
vignettes and anecdotes of Lawyerland present a backstage view of the law 
that supplements or, more aptly, displaces the audience’s normal view of 
how the law, legal system, and lawyers operate. Traditional jurisprudence 
focuses on broad issues of the nature and development of law, which in 
turn center on judicial issues, the development of judicial review, and 
constitutional law in the Supreme Court.130 In this conception, law is clear 
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and orderly, implicating a textual provision that is then placed before 
judges who render an interpretation that becomes the ruling law of the land. 
Procedurally, there are no mysteries regarding the course and outcome of 
the case, and even if there is disagreement on the substantive outcome, the 
reasons can be clearly stated and assessed through a comparison of 
opinions. Lawyerland’s rejection of this popular conception of law and 
jurisprudence inheres in the response of Carl Wylie, a transactional lawyer, 
to the question of what he thinks the law is.131 The interviewer notes that 
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. had termed the law a “great 
anthropological document,” 132  which launches Wylie on a derisive riff 
regarding the Supreme Court’s decision in Romer v. Evans, 133  and the 
general role of the Supreme Court in the legal landscape of the practicing 
lawyer: “I haven’t read [the decision]—I am never going to read it, are 
you? Who ever reads Supreme Court opinions?”134 The rhetorical question 
implies that the Supreme Court is set up as a remote presence from the 
practice of Wylie and most attorneys. The rule of law as enunciated or 
penned by the Court may become the law of the land and serve to order 
certain relationships, but its reasoning is often a point of irrelevance to 
practitioners who are ultimately concerned with the end result. Although 
the Court’s decisions are binding nationally, its influence can extend no 
further than the circumstances and situations in which it is deciding cases. 
Accordingly, despite its Olympian heights in the American legal hierarchy, 
the Court is of less practical significance than the discussions and decisions 
that are taken at the lower, base levels of contemporary legal practice. 
The traditionalist conception of jurisprudence is a narrow one that 
leaves much of legal reality on the outside of legal experience. Lawyerland 
presents an antithetical view of the law by focusing on its actual practice, 
as opposed to its study, and the everyday in-the-trenches practice of law, as 
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opposed to the glamorous and rarefied roles typically accentuated by 
society. In the words of Pierre Schlag, a constitutional law scholar: 
Lawyerland is law at the operator level. For Lawyerland’s lawyers, law is 
something they live on the way to doing something else—serving a client, 
putting someone in jail, or ruling on a motion. Law is just a part of what you 
use to get things done. Here, the law is mundane. It inspires neither 
celebration nor awe.135 
The law for the AUSA and his district attorney cohorts is a means to a 
socially sanctioned revenge, whereas the exploitation of those same 
relationships is Robinson’s means to free his client. Singleton, an attorney 
in Lawyerland specializing in malpractice defense, responds to an 
associate’s chagrin at settling a case where she believed that her client did 
nothing wrong: “I told her right or wrong has nothing to do with it. If we 
thought—if the client thought—it was worth the money to litigate, we 
would have litigated . . . . The law, I told her, is just another—and not 
always that important—transactional consideration.”136 Similarly, Martha 
Tharaud, a labor law specialist, points to a young Asian woman, an 
employee at the restaurant where she is eating, and ponders whether she 
even understands her legal rights and whether she would exercise them if a 
situation arose. 137  Laywerland asks: What are all the Supreme Court’s 
decisions on employment or insurance law to someone who inhabits a 
world where those rights are unlikely to be understood or exercised? The 
law provides a framework, perhaps, but it is not self-actualizing, nor is 
there a necessary trickle-down effect from the heights of the legal system to 
the basements of New York City or the noodle shops of Chinatown. 
Lawyerland depicts the law as a practical tool to be used in the appropriate 
circumstances, but whose efficacy should not be taken for granted. 
The law, from this practical perspective, develops through its practice 
at the lowest levels as a function of lawyers representing clients in any and 
all matters. Thus, in reviewing Lawyerland, David Luban contended that 
the judiciary or legislative branches do not power the legal system: 
The real engine powering [this] legal system is the nearly one million 
practicing lawyers, each conducting thirty or fifty or one hundred 
conversations a day with each other and with their clients. These 
conversations, not the decisions and opinions of judges, are the law. They 
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form a jumble, not an ordered system—not law’s empire but law’s landfill, 
the dregs and dreck of legal authority on which civilization is erected.138 
At this base level of the law, the power and authority reside not in the 
elegantly written word or boldly expressed idea, but in the simple, direct, 
well-placed, and potentially crass spoken word of the law’s 
representative—the lawyer. The depiction of law in Lawyerland thus 
operates to invert the traditional conception of the American legal pyramid 
by placing influence at the lowest levels of that hierarchy and relegating the 
grand actors of traditional jurisprudence to biting asides. In the words of 
Luban, a law and philosophy scholar, “[t]he cellar is where law influences 
client behavior, and so the cellar is actually the apex of legal authority. 
Judge centered jurisprudence distorts reality by proceeding on the opposite 
assumption.” 139  Law is not Justice Holmes’s great anthropological 
document, but the mind-numbing and exasperating chaos of Wylie.140 The 
true home of the law is not the Ivory Towers of elite law schools, nor the 
Marble Palace of the Supreme Court, but the dingy and dank halls of the 
Brooklyn housing court, the aromatic interior of Manhattan Detention 
Complex, aptly and colloquially referred to as “The Tombs,” and the web 
of social relations which Robinson strategically uses.141 
Behind the façade of chaos posited by Wylie, however, there is a 
system of rules and conduct that governs the relationships of the lawyers 
and law in Lawyerland. It is Wylie who asserts that there is a base line, 
minimal set of rules that all parties to the law must observe.142 In fact, 
observance of these rules is the dividing line between the cynical lawyer 
and the cynic: the cynical lawyer acknowledges the existence of these rules 
and operates within them, whereas the cynic simply disregards them.143 
These rules aren’t clear-cut procedural guidelines, such as filing a certain 
number of copies of a pleading, nor substantive rules, but instead they are 
the gray area between representations, permissible “misrepresentations,” 
and outright lying. In Lawyerland, Judge Day asserts that the art of 
lawyering involves deception, spin, and a certain amount of distortion, but 
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that the majority of lawyers recognizes the general outline of these rules 
and operates within the permissible bounds of misrepresentation.144 
Operating within this field of misrepresentation, however, gives rise to 
a peculiarly legal conception of reality and truth, which in turn skews the 
consciousness of the lawyer himself. In Lawyerland, Martha Tharaud, a 
law firm partner, asserts that the truth, for lawyers, lies in between what 
can and cannot be proven—a particularly legalistic thought that conflicts 
with the common belief that the truth lies in the reality of what actually 
happened. 145  This belief can itself be turned on its head by the law, 
according to the lawyer, Shumate, as issues of causation and liability can 
transform what could have happened into what did happen in the eyes of 
the law.146 The goal of Lawyerland’s law is to arrive at a resolution of a 
given issue through the presentation of competing versions of the same 
event, and this task is undertaken without regard to any contradictions that 
a “created” version of the event may have with the actuality of that event. 
In the concluding interview, the interviewee notes that lawyers can keep 
multiple contradictions in their heads at any one point while talking as if 
everything is consistent.147 This ability contributes to the lawyer’s skewing 
of reality. Professor Sarah Krakoff notes: 
[M]ost lawyers hold conflicting things in their heads, but without the poet’s 
negative capability to remain content with partial understanding. Rather 
than assimilate the conflicts into ambiguous mysteries, as poets do, they 
simply alternate their realities. At one moment, one thing is true, and at 
another, the opposite is true.148 
Joseph echoes this point both outside and within the bounds of Lawyerland. 
Elsewhere, Joseph has written that, 
[L]awyers like to concentrate meaning; a lawyer’s language is often dense. 
And if you look at law as a single language, you realize that it contains 
various languages within it. Think of how many different languages exist, 
for example, in an appellate brief that addresses a number of complicated 
procedural and substantive issues.149 
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An appellate brief or trial motion entertains the same lack of negative 
capability highlighted by Krakoff. At one point, a pleading may vigorously 
contest an issue, whereas that same issue may be assumed for purposes of 
contesting a different issue. The pleading certainly will not note any 
contradiction, nor will any lawyer party to the proceedings think anything 
is amiss. The law promotes this perpetuation of both competing languages 
and contradictory presentations of reality. Joseph, this time conveying a 
lawyer’s remembrance of a non-lawyer’s view of attorneys, expresses 
exasperation at the fact that lawyers are always saying something other 
than what they mean.150 This is not necessarily lying, and lawyers are not 
necessarily consciously manipulative; “lawyers have large shadows. 
Anything light . . . makes their shadows even larger.”151 
These ruminations return the focus to the issue of perspective. In an 
essay, Joseph discusses “‘working rules’ assembled from notes” he took 
when writing Lawyerland.152 “Rule 13” is “what a lawyer, as a lawyer, 
senses—what a lawyer, as a lawyer, perceives—what a lawyer, as a lawyer, 
feels.”153 By focusing on the lawyer’s experience of law, and by implicitly 
recognizing the lawyer’s particular experience of the law as unique, Joseph 
subtly portrays the importance of perspective in constructing one’s 
experience of the legal system. In one sense that system possesses an 
objective reality, being comprised of statutes, constitutions, regulations, 
lawyers to argue about the proper interpretation of these legal documents, 
and judges to render definitive rulings regarding that interpretation. Yet it 
cannot make sense to talk about legal experience solely by reference to the 
underlying reality of the legal system. Whether one views the law as a 
carefully ordered system of rules or malevolent whimsy is less dependent 
on that underlying reality than it is on how that reality is experienced. 
Joseph, through Robinson, offers an explicit bridge to Kafka on this point, 
riffing from The Metamorphosis,154 that it would be “a form of exacting 
justice” if lawyers metamorphosed into prisoners, and vice versa.155 The 
law itself will not have changed in engaging in this metamorphosis, but the 
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perspective will shift. What may have once looked like a clear-cut 
application of a mandatory minimum sentence under the sentencing 
guidelines may look arbitrary and seem like a cruel and unusual 
punishment. Robinson’s thought can be translated into any number of 
contexts—if a lawyer metamorphosed into any litigant or defendant the 
perspectival shift would be complete. 
Kafka and Joseph provide complementary depictions of the law 
because of their distinct uses of perspective. Kafka’s writing focuses on the 
experience of law by the litigant or legal outsider, whereas Joseph focuses 
on the lawyers and judges within the system. Together, these writings 
provide a comprehensive picture of a modern jurisprudence by detailing the 
views and experiences of all parties to the system. Before addressing the 
jurisprudential implications of these stories, however, it is worth examining 
one additional Kafka short story, In the Penal Colony, because this piece 
offers the most explicit glimpse of the internal workings of Kafka’s legal 
machinery. In essence, In the Penal Colony provides Kafka’s own 
counterpoint to his more obscure writings on the law. 
In the Penal Colony recounts an explorer’s visit to a relatively remote 
penal colony, where he is invited to witness the execution of a soldier.156 
This soldier was found asleep on duty where he was charged with guarding 
the door of a certain captain.157 The captain, seeking to determine whether 
this duty was being discharged, observed the soldier sleeping on duty.158 
The captain lashed the soldier, at which point the soldier grabbed the 
captain’s leg and shouted, “Throw that whip away or I’ll eat you alive.”159 
This chain of events was recounted by the captain to the officer in charge 
of legal proceedings on the island and the officer passed a sentence only 
one hour prior to the commencement of the execution itself.160 For his 
sentence the condemned man is ordered to have “Honor Thy Superiors” 
etched onto his body by an elaborate machine in a manner that will 
eventually, after twelve hours of suffering and “[e]nlightenment,” result in 
his death.161 
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Inquiring into this chain of events, the explorer learns that the 
condemned soldier does not know his sentence nor his transgression.162 In 
fact, the condemned man does not even speak the language of the officer or 
the colonizers of the island.163 Regarding the process of conviction, the 
officer acts as the sole judge, and his guiding principle is that “[g]uilt is 
never to be doubted.”164  Commensurate with such a first principle, no 
defense is countenanced by the officer’s procedures; the charging statement 
of the captain, or any other complainant, is sufficient in itself.165 Succinctly 
stated by the officer himself: 
I wrote down [the captain’s] statement and appended the sentence to it. 
Then I had the man put in chains. That was all quite simple. If I had first 
called the man before me and interrogated him, things would have got into a 
confused tangle. He would have told a lie, and had I exposed these lies he 
would have backed them up with more lies, and so on and so forth. As it is, 
I’ve got him and I won’t let him go.—Is that quite clear now?166 
The text of the sentence, to be carved into the body of the man, is itself so 
complex and embellished that even on paper the explorer cannot 
understand the words.167 This point is also deemed irrelevant by the officer, 
as the text of the sentence is not meant to be comprehended on paper, but 
through the body itself.168 This enlightenment was often, according to the 
officer, seen on the faces of the condemned men in bygone days, although 
use of the execution machine has fallen into disfavor under new leadership 
in the colony.169 
The story proceeds feverishly and fatalistically once the officer 
realizes that the explorer believes that his process of law and practice of 
execution are barbaric.170 Setting the condemned man free, the officer takes 
his place in the machine after passing his own sentence and setting his own 
inscription: “Be Just!”171 The machine, however, disintegrates during the 
course of the officer’s execution/suicide depriving him of the twelve-hour 
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process of inscription and the enlightenment he had purportedly seen on so 
many other faces.172 In the end, the explorer quickly escapes the island 
after visiting the grave of the former commandant and inventor of the 
execution machine.173 
In the Penal Colony and The Trial differ only inasmuch as they 
provide distinct perspectives on the identical issue. K. and the condemned 
man, for instance, share many similarities—neither knows the charge 
against them and neither has been provided with a meaningful opportunity 
to answer and defend the charge. Unlike K., the condemned man escaped 
execution, but neither has clarity about what actually transpired. There is 
no semblance of due process in either case and, for the defendants in both, 
the legal system is incomprehensible and secretive; to K. it is 
incomprehensible for unknown, systemic reasons, and to the condemned 
man on account of the language barrier and the nature of the legal process 
conceived by the officer. 
Just as there are compelling bases to deem K. and the condemned man 
interchangeable in these works, the officer easily can be conceived of as a 
court functionary operating within the universe of The Trial. The officer 
discharges his obligations as a legal officer, although similar to the court, 
he does so in a secretive manner outside the presence of the defendant. 
Like the court, he presumes the guilt of the defendant and follows actions 
derived from that initial presumption—the necessity of punishment derives 
from the bare fact of the accusation itself. Regarding process, the officer 
also does not tolerate any defense to the charges, just as the court does not 
provide any official avenues for a defense. Finally, the redemptive moment 
in both stories involves contact with the physical body. In The Trial, it is K. 
who is expected to grab the knife and make the final plunge, presumably on 
an understanding of the sentence passed and the reasons for it.174 For the 
condemned man, that final enlightenment comes when the sentence is felt 
on the body itself, through the torturous process of the inscription.175 In 
broad outlines, then, the officer gives a human face and explanation to the 
mysterious inner workings of the court. It is not an explanation that will 
likely soothe concerns over the nature of law and process in The Trial, but 
it is an explanation that takes that depiction of law outside the scope of 
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malevolent whimsy or mere arbitrariness. There are concrete and rational 
reasons for what occurs, even if one can justly condemn the nature and 
application of the process. 
The difference between the law as depicted in The Trial and In the 
Penal Colony is thus perspectival, not substantive. Whereas K. provides a 
view of the law from the perspective of the condemned man, the officer 
provides the complementary view from the perspective of the law itself. 
Where there is mystery, disorder, and chaos from one view, from the 
opposite view the system appears simple, well ordered, and scrupulously 
applied. K. is condemned by an authority operating just out of his reach, 
just as the officer condemns the soldier without bothering to inform him of 
the charge or sentence. The absence of law in K.’s case can be explained by 
the processes of the officer in the colony, whereby there is not an absolute 
absence of law, but a calculated decision to conduct a system in a certain 
way. The law of The Trial is not, in comparison, malevolent whimsy, but 
an actual system of rules, albeit a system that is incomprehensible or 
inaccessible to the defendant himself. The law is not, however, objectively 
malevolent or tragically whimsical. Rather, it is the perspective of the 
individual that dictates the view or interpretation of the law in these stories. 
To the officer nothing seems more rational than the processes he employs 
in dealing with transgressions on the colony; a different system seems 
incomprehensible to him, and would inevitably lead away from clarity and 
truth. Nothing seems more daunting, absurd, and ridiculous than the law to 
K., trapped on the outside and uninitiated into the peculiarities of its rules 
and processes. Whatever else may be said about the law in these cases, it is 
far from extraordinary. 
This reading of In the Penal Colony does not somehow definitively 
establish that Kafka’s writings on the law must be read as jurisprudential 
allegories, or that the law is even what is at issue in these texts. Yet Kafka’s 
own depiction of a functioning, albeit arbitrary, legal system in this story 
does support looking beyond the surface of his other writings on the law to 
determine what might be lurking behind the superficial appearances. An 
argument has been made here that Joseph provides the appropriate 
framework for what lies behind the curtain in Kafka’s texts. The 
implications of that argument are the subject of the following section. 
IV. THE POSSIBILITIES OF JURISPRUDENTIAL LITERATURE 
Judge Posner’s critique of using Kafka to gain some further 
understanding of the law or legal process focuses on how dissimilar 
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Kafka’s depiction is from contemporary understandings of law.176 The lack 
of recognition of law in the writings of Kafka, as he understands it, leads 
Judge Posner to the conclusion that these texts have no importance to legal 
debate. Contrary to Judge Posner’s position on Kafka, no commentator has 
doubted the role and significance of law in Lawyerland. Rather, the 
concern is whether law and literature, as a project, survives the depiction of 
law that Joseph offers. In her contribution to the Columbia Law Review 
symposium on Lawyerland, Krakoff noted two distinct trends within the 
broader law and literature movement.177 The first holds that “literature, by 
cultivating the literary imagination and thereby inducing empathy, can have 
a salutary effect on judging and lawyering. This position can be 
summarized as follows: Literature can help law become more humane and 
just.”178 The second asserts that, 
[L]aw is inherently literary, and . . . law can become its best self only if we 
fill its gaps with a cultivated comprehension of our literary 
heritage . . . . [I]ts essence is the belief that law’s salvation lies in the liberal 
arts educated, literary sensibility . . . . Law is already part of, and should be 
informed by, the literary canon.179 
Lawyerland threatens both of these positions: 
[O]ne hardly steps away from reading Lawyerland with a more acute sense 
of empathy for any particular group. Rather, the overwhelming feelings the 
lawyers in Lawyerland  engender are alienation and despair. Regarding the 
second claim, when considered collectively, the qualities of the lawyers in 
Lawyerland are such that they (truthfully) blur the boundaries between law, 
life, and art, making it impossible, or at the very least unworkable, to claim 
a distinct aesthetics for law-as-literature from which societal norms can be 
gleaned.180 
If Krakoff is correct in her assertions then, according to her, 
[T]he questions posed by law and literature are potentially obsolete. Law is 
part of the fabric of our literature, but not in the way [James Boyd] White 
means. It is, the way it is now: crass, vulgar, disjunctive, dissociative. Law, 
like art, can only be what it is now. If this is the case, then the normative 
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aspirations of [Martha] Nussbaum and others are also in trouble: Literature 
and poetry are Lawyerland, so what could we possibly hope to educate 
judges about that they don’t already know?181 
Krakoff’s critique has much to recommend to law and literature, but it 
is not fatal to it, even on its own terms. The characters of Lawyerland are 
for the most part un-empathetic, but that alone does not represent a defeat 
for the normative aspirations of Nussbaum or Robin West. The normative 
appeal of Atticus Finch in To Kill a Mockingbird182 is simply reversed in 
the context of Lawyerland; the reader or lawyer is shown a glimpse not of 
who they may want to be, or could be, but of the lawyer they might shudder 
to become. Normativeness need not be positive, and the fact that a 
distinctly negative normative impulse is present in Lawyerland simply 
means that the focus must shift—not that law and literature needs to be 
thrown out with the chaff. As to Krakoff’s second critique, if Lawyerland is 
poetry and literature, and at the same time is representative of the aesthetic 
world in which judges and lawyers operate, then there is strength to her 
assertion that the legal community may not benefit from broader exposure 
to the liberal arts. Lawyerland does not exhaust the range of aesthetic 
opportunities that could define the unitary life of a judge, lawyer, or 
common citizen. It does not stand definitively in the category of “poetry” 
or “literature” any more than any piece that came before it, nor does it 
somehow limit the experiential range of legal actors. For example, to say a 
judge may be exposed to the parade of horribles that is the law of 
Lawyerland is not to say he or she cannot benefit from broader exposure to 
literature, or that this broader exposure would be unable to conversely 
reflect back into his professional life in a positive sense. 
Beyond potential concerns with Krakoff’s interpretation of 
Lawyerland and its implications for law and literature, however, is a more 
fundamental shortcoming—the two “schools” of law and literature she 
notes are themselves not exhaustive of how the law and literature 
movement has been pursued. The most fundamental omission in Krakoff’s 
essay is the conception of literature as jurisprudence—the assertion that the 
appearance of law in literature may have something meaningful to say 
about law as a system. 183  This is a narrow category within law and 
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literature and is not dependent on the appearance of law alone in a text. 
Rather, to constitute a literary jurisprudence, the text must explore the 
contours of law itself in a systematic fashion. In the words of Luban, 
writing in the same symposium issue of the Columbia Law Review, 
“Lawyerland, nonfiction, is a work of art and artifice about law, what we 
might call jurisprudential fiction—a book that uses the techniques of fiction 
to explore the true nature of law.”184 So, too, Kafka’s writings on the law 
do not present the law as a superficial actor in the narrative, but are 
themselves attempts to come to terms with the law as an authority, force, 
and system. For this reason, both writers present jurisprudential narratives. 
The possibilities of jurisprudential literature should be clear as 
jurisprudence, literature, and philosophy have intersected for as long as 
each discipline has existed. In the last two centuries alone, some of the 
most influential thinkers have used narrative forms to express philosophical 
ideas. Albert Camus and Jean-Paul Sartre teased out the limits of 
existentialism through works such as Camus’s novels The Stranger185 and 
The Plague,186 Sartre’s play No Exit,187 and his prose works, including the 
Roads to Freedom188 trilogy and Nausea.189 C.S. Lewis supplemented his 
purely theological works with a narrative theology, embodied in The Great 
Divorce 190  and The Screwtape Letters. 191  Friedrich Nietzsche often 
employed the narrative form in expressing his philosophy, most famously 
in his parable of the madman contained within The Gay Science,192 but also 
in Thus Spake Zarathustra. 193  Soren Kierkegaard, likewise, utilized the 
literary form and literary prototypes to convey the at-times absurdity of 
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modern existence. For example, Abraham and Isaac in Fear and 
Trembling194 and Either/Or195 convey this absurdity. At the root of the 
enlightenment was Voltaire’s Candide, 196  a biting satirical attack on 
contemporary philosophical forms. 
Jurists have likewise used the narrative form to illustrate various 
jurisprudential points. 197  Ronald Dworkin’s mythic judge “Hercules,” 
striving valiantly for right answers to even the most intractable 
jurisprudential quandaries, fits within this tradition. 198  So, too, would 
Judith Jarvis Thomson’s famous article on abortion, which sought to 
defend the practice through analogical reasoning.199 To read literature as 
implicating, addressing, and answering jurisprudential questions follows on 
these traditions of the narrative form, acting as a medium through which 
systemic thought may be conveyed. It is with these traditions in mind that 
Joseph’s Lawyerland and Kafka’s legal writings must be weighed and 
measured. 
The import of such literature, however, has been obscured by the 
development of highly formal contemporary jurisprudence and 
constitutional fetishism. These developments have largely severed the 
practice of law from the law of the academy. This disconnect between legal 
practice and jurisprudence is highlighted by the appearance of law in both 
Lawyerland and Kafka’s writings, and is implicit in Judge Posner’s 
criticism that the law of Kafka, by not appearing as a “system of rules,” is 
not law at all.200 Concededly, Joseph and Kafka have little in common with 
the titans of twentieth century jurisprudence. Legal Philosopher John 
Austin and his command theory of the law certainly do not fit within the 
context of either author.201  Any sovereign seems nonexistent in Kafka, 
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where the law pervades everything without being directed from anywhere, 
whereas Joseph’s lawyers openly mock those actors sitting at the apex of 
American legal authority. The “Grundnorm” of Austrian Jurist and 
Philosopher Hans Kelsen similarly seems either beyond reach (in Kafka), 
or non-existent (in Joseph).202 Any “rule of recognition” would seem to be 
striving futilely for an object within both Kafka and Joseph.203 Where are 
the valid legal norms in the context of Robinson’s story?204 In what sense 
would the rule operate where the pronouncement of valid norms is itself a 
point of irrelevance for legal actors, such as in Wylie’s derisive rant on the 
Supreme Court?205 Can any judgment on the validity of the relevant legal 
rules be made in Kafka’s writings, where it is not even clear what those 
rules are? Interpretivist legal theories also run on the rough shoals of 
Joseph and Kafka. 206  In Joseph, the concept of law may inhere in its 
practice, but the depiction of that practice leaves little room for claims 
regarding a confluence of law and morality, and even less for any 
normative argument based on that practice. Finally, Lawyerland’s depiction 
of law seems an outright rejection of natural law theory, whereas the 
“is/ought” dilemma takes center stage in Kafka’s writings on the law.207 
Joseph and Kafka do not present the reader with a clearly 
systematized conception of jurisprudence, nor do they focus their sights on 
the rarefied apex of their respective legal universes. Joseph’s characters, 
specifically Wylie, belittle the decisions of the Supreme Court, questioning 
whether anybody even reads them.208 The higher courts, grand justices, and 
great lawyers of Kafka’s legal system still engender awe, but simply as 
tales of a bygone gilded age.209 This is in stark contrast to the constitutional 
fetishism that informs so much of contemporary legal scholarship. Since 
James Bradley Thayer’s 1893 essay, The Origin and Scope of the American 
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Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 210  a veritable “who’s who” of legal 
scholars have engaged in the design of grand theories of constitutional law 
and judicial review. Justice Holmes described the design and history of the 
common law;211 Herbert Wechsler, legal scholar and former director of the 
American Law Institute, proposed neutral principles to guide the 
increasingly charged field of constitutional adjudication;212 and Alexander 
Bickel, a noted constitutional law scholar, advocated for the passive 
virtues213—nearly four decades before Cass Sunstein, another noted legal 
scholar, championed judicial minimalism. 214  Judicial review has also 
become the focus of much legal debate in the past decades, engaging legal 
scholars such as Charles Black,215 John Ely,216 and Larry Kramer,217 in an 
attempt to justify or criticize courts’ authority to strike down the 
enactments of Congress. 
“Academic legal thought, as a matter of its own form, 
characteristically represents law as formal, ideational, appellate court 
focused, judge-centric, and normatively inspired.”218 In essence, the law of 
the academy is the law of Judge Posner—a system of rules that, by 
definition, excludes malevolent whimsy, arbitrariness, and capriciousness. 
Law need only be applied to certain factual situations. The fact that 
reasonable minds may differ on that application does not undercut law’s 
objective pretensions. Kafka obviously moves far beyond this conception 
of law in his own writings, where law is portrayed as fickle, mysterious, 
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and unbound by any conventional understanding of “rules.” Likewise, “the 
very style of Lawyerland, its informal language, its focus on self and 
context, its grim and accursed visions, its compromised moralities, and its 
flamboyant emotional registers all lead away from the ways in which 
academic legal thought frames and represents law.”219 If the writings of 
Kafka and Joseph lead away from conventional legal discourse, where do 
they lead? Do the visions of each lead to a coherent and constructive 
jurisprudence, or is the law simply arbitrary and malevolent? Is there 
something of worth to be gleaned from these descriptions, or are the legal 
universes of Kafka and Joseph simply playgrounds for a nihilistic, 
destructive jurisprudence? 
To the first question, a coherent jurisprudence can be derived from 
Kafka and Joseph and, consistent with the first two Sections of this Article, 
this jurisprudence is based on a complementary reading of both authors’ 
literary writings on law. To the second question, this jurisprudence is not 
destructive or nihilistic, but constructive, vaguely interpretivist, and, most 
importantly, realist. 
Kafka and Joseph are jurisprudential littérateurs on account of how 
they present the law in their legal writings. Law is not simply a plot point 
and the legal actors are not simply characters through which the story 
progresses. Both writers attempt to address the nature of law, although this 
fact is somewhat obscured by their presentations. Kafka’s jurisprudence is 
hidden behind the absurdity of the legal worlds he constructs, whether in 
The Trial, Before the Law, or The Knock at the Manor Gate. Yet, as made 
clear when the curtain is withdrawn in In the Penal Colony, there is a 
system of law in place, which has its own rules, its own actors, and its own 
subjects.220 Even if Kafka’s writings often fail to offer any meaningful 
explication of the system he constructs, they do represent attempts to come 
to terms with the nature of the law to which each of his diverse characters 
is ultimately subjected. In this sense, his writings are eminently 
jurisprudential. Likewise, despite the anecdotal and episodic structure of 
Lawyerland, the interviewees each attempt to come to terms with the nature 
of the legal system within which they are operating. These episodes, when 
compiled and read together, produce an examination of the nature of law. It 
is because of this broad attempt to deduce the nature and content of law 
that Kafka and Joseph are jurisprudential writers, and for the same reason, 
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why their writings can be read as specifically advancing jurisprudential 
thinking. 
Characterizing Kafka and Joseph as jurisprudential writers, however, 
leaves open the question of the nature of their jurisprudential visions. For 
both, written, codified, and decisional law is simply the frame of reference 
through which legal reality passes. The traditional founts of law—statutes, 
regulations, and reported decisions—are so unimportant to Kafka that there 
is never explicit mention of any of these sources. Even in In the Penal 
Colony, it is not clear on what basis the officer concludes that the 
condemned has transgressed a norm—is it a statutory or regulatory 
prescription, or an informal norm inherent in the conduct of the colony? 
Kafka never elucidates this point, even as he gives his clearest depiction of 
a legal system in operation. Joseph does address a number of traditional 
legal sources and norms, but these are never presented center stage. Wylie 
gives his dismissive view of the Supreme Court and its decision in Romer 
v. Evans,221 but nobody ever discusses how Supreme Court decisions affect 
their practices or why those decisions have significance to the legal 
community. Tharaud, the labor law attorney, ponders whether the girl 
serving her has any idea about the range of legal protections to which she 
may be entitled—both generally as an employee and specifically in the case 
of an accident or unfair termination. 222  New York state statutes are 
implicated by Tharaud’s thinking, but are ancillary to the question of the 
exercise—whether this girl could or would exercise those rights that the 
law ostensibly bestows upon her. Elsewhere, Singleton’s young associate 
plaintively asserts that her client has done nothing wrong to warrant 
agreeing to a settlement, an assertion that implicates questions of liability 
and causation, and any number of potential statutory, regulatory, and 
common law standards—only to be rebuffed that right or wrong have little 
to do with the settlement.223 Of course, if right and wrong have little to do 
with the settlement, than the various statutory and regulatory standards, 
and, by extension, the law itself, has little to do with the settlement. 
Yet to say that the law has little to do with the settlement already 
assumes a definition of what constitutes the law. That assumption, in the 
context of contemporary legal thinking, holds that the category of law is 
exhausted by positive law—statutes, regulations, decisional law, and other 
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administrative adjudications. By placing these grounds of law to the side, 
however, both Kafka and Joseph reframe the issue of what constitutes law 
by focusing on the practice of lawyering and the application of law. 
Revisiting the words of Schlag in reference to Joseph, “Lawyerland is law 
at the operator level. For Lawyerland’s lawyers, law is something they live 
on the way to doing something else—serving a client, putting someone in 
jail, or ruling on a motion. Law is just a part of what you use to get things 
done.”224 From this assertion, however, Schlag does not make the next 
leap, which is to tease out the jurisprudential implications of Joseph’s 
depiction of law. Law exists only as it is applied by legal actors or 
manipulated in the course of unfolding legal relationships. Traditional 
forms of law are indeed mundane in the context of Lawyerland, and of 
almost no importance to Kafka, but that does not make law itself mundane, 
as law refers to something entirely different from statutes and regulations 
and Supreme Court decisions. Law, as understood by Kafka and Joseph, 
arises from the intricate web of relationships conditioned by the existence 
and perpetuation of the legal system. Codes and regulations are simply 
sources that attempt to frame these relationships, but the law does not 
sprout into existence until these sources are utilized, applied, or referenced. 
Law does not exist objectively as law outside its application. A statute is 
words on a page; a judicial decision is simply an historical marker of the 
resolution of a dispute. These sources hold no interest, and do not 
constitute law until they are implicated in a present dispute or situation, at 
which point the various legal actors subjected to that dispute give the law 
its life and content. 
The jurisprudential extrapolation from Schlag’s assertion is Luban’s 
characterization of the root of Joseph’s legal system: “The real engine 
powering the legal system is the nearly one million practicing lawyers, 
each conducting thirty or fifty or one hundred conversations a day with 
each other and with their clients. These conversations, not the decisions and 
opinions of judges, are the law.” 225  The relational aspect of law is 
highlighted by this observation, and given flesh by Kafka and Joseph. For 
Joseph, the law is the interactions between the AUSA burglary-victim, his 
brother-in-law, and the prosecuting ADA, as well as Robinson’s well-
placed innuendos regarding the root of the charges against his client, rather 
than the statutory provisions pursuant to which the burglar was charged. 
 
 224.  Schlag, supra note 134, at 1738. 
 225.  Luban, supra note 138, at 1767. 
88 Southern California Interdisciplinary Law Journal [Vol. 21:47 
 
Regarding Tharaud’s musings on the rights of the girl who served her, the 
content of the law must remain empty in the abstract; if the young woman 
does not know her rights, she cannot exercise them in any meaningful way. 
Even if she knows her rights, if her employers simply do not recognize 
those rights, it means little to point to the text of a statute. The law can take 
its content and exercise its authority only if properly invoked, but it can 
only be properly invoked if the appropriate relationships converge. 
This last point also provides a bridge to Kafka, mirroring Dominique 
Gros’s hypothesis that perhaps the man from the country, in seeking the 
law, failed to invoke some necessary procedural rule or perfect his 
appeal.226 The content of the law in Before the Law remains empty and fails 
to take the man as its object; this could simply imply, however, that without 
properly entering into a relationship with the law, the law has no real 
presence. A relationship with the law is exactly what K. chases in The 
Trial, and it is through the least powerful actors, at least superficially, that 
he proceeds—Leni, Block, Titorelli. K. gains no information, only 
obfuscation, from the officials of the legal system. Even the priest is hardly 
elucidatory in his recounting of the parable and its various interpretations. 
The relational nature of Kafka’s law is further bolstered by the possible 
dispositions of K.’s own trial. Ostensible acquittal places the litigant in the 
unsure position of possibly being rearrested or perhaps being caught in an 
indefinite cycle of proceedings.227 Whether this takes place is dependent on 
who comes into contact with the case and what other contacts K. himself is 
able to make. If he can consistently gain the support of some judges, 
ostensibly he can just as consistently be acquitted again. Likewise, 
indefinite postponement forces the litigant to continually press his case 
with the officials of the law, through personal entreaties and filings, until 
the case becomes so bogged down in process that a disposition is not 
reached while the litigant is alive. 228  This course of conduct requires 
constant attention to the proceedings, as Titorelli makes clear, and constant 
interactions with any number of official and quasi-official servants of the 
law. In both situations, a premium is placed on the interactions of the 
individual with the officials of the law, from which arises the very concept 
of law within Kafka’s system. 
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The law of Joseph and Kafka derives its content from relationships. 
Prior to being invoked, it is simply an abstract and largely empty norm. 
Only by being applied in concrete situations does it take upon itself a 
certain reality, and that reality exists only so long as the relationship lasts. 
This process is continually unfolding across any range of relationships and 
legal actors, and its transience does not undercut its immanence in those 
cases where it has been invoked. This focus on relationships conditioned by 
the traditional sources of the law is in sharp contrast to those jurisprudential 
writers noted earlier. Austin’s command theory,229 for instance, has little 
relevance in Kafka’s universe where there is no clear source of the law to 
term “sovereign.” One could hypothesize such a sovereign, but his 
existence would not fit comfortably with the remainder of the narrative, 
where the focus always remains on how the law intertwines itself with the 
relationships of those brought within its midst. Kelsen’s attempts to denote 
a Grundnorm and “rule of recognition”230 are of only passing interest to 
Joseph’s lawyers. What matters is not whether some norm is legitimate or 
whether norm y has been properly derived from norm x. What matters is 
the application of prevailing legal norms, and the legitimacy of that 
application will be conditioned by the form that the relations take on that 
application. For Robinson’s burglar, it is likely little comfort that the 
statutes under which he was charged were properly passed by the New 
York state legislature and signed into law by the governor. They are valid 
in that sense, and in the traditional jurisprudential sense, but that validity 
has little to say about the nature of law. 
By moving away from traditional jurisprudence in this specific way, 
Kafka and Joseph also necessarily have to relocate the foci of their legal 
systems. The focus is no longer on courts, but rather on an endlessly 
multiplying series of antechambers where the law is developed and applied. 
In the words of Luban, juxtaposing Joseph’s portrayal of the law against 
traditional jurisprudence, “[t]he cellar is where law influences client 
behavior, and so the cellar is actually the apex of legal authority.”231 This 
base level of the legal system is where most important decisions are taken, 
including whether or not to prosecute, how to proceed with a claim, and 
whether to enter into a settlement. These decisions, and the way in which 
they are made, are given primary focus in Joseph. The locus of these 
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decisions tracks Titorelli’s statement to K., that he must gain influence 
outside the bounds of the courts—in the consulting rooms, lobbies, even 
Titorelli’s own studio.232 K. is certainly more successful in penetrating the 
court’s curtains outside the official bounds of his proceeding, lending 
further credence to Judge Day’s assertion that the real power does indeed 
exist outside the courts. 233  Likewise, Robinson is more successful in 
gaining his client’s release through well-placed words on the cocktail 
circuit than he was in direct consultation with the District Attorney’s office. 
It is in the crummy interior of the Brooklyn housing court and the 
suffocating atmosphere of Titorelli’s studio that real legal decisions are 
taken. 
In both form and focus, Kafka’s and Joseph’s narratives mark a sharp 
departure from traditional jurisprudence. Despite this, the depiction of law 
each offers is profoundly jurisprudential—it is a systematic investigation of 
the nature of law. This point aside, however, both writers not only move 
away from traditional forms of jurisprudence, but place into doubt whether 
academic jurisprudence can say anything meaningful about the nature of 
law at all. For one, the increasing distance between most academics and the 
actual world of legal practice represents a certain disconnect in how law is 
conceived. Schlag hints at this concern: 
Lawyers and judges face real stakes (however mediated these may be). 
Their words are hooked up with, and they bring into play, institutional 
arrangements that visit legal acts on clients, parties, and third parties. The 
acts do land on somebody. The law of the academy, by contrast, is law in 
the air. It’s free-floating. It doesn’t land. Much as law teachers may want to 
pretend otherwise, their words in the classroom, in the law review article, or 
at the conference panel do not engage an already-in-place legal 
machinery.234 
Thus, it is not clear that academic legal thought can keep pace with the 
realities of legal practice, or that jurisprudence, as presently conceived, can 
be of practical interest or importance outside of academia. 
Even if there were an impetus to do so, however, the nature of Kafka’s 
and Joseph’s writings raise the question of how the realities of legal 
practice could be depicted in the systematic and distilled fashion of the 
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academic. The truthfulness of Joseph’s writing is beyond dispute. As 
Professor Philip N. Meyer wrote: 
Joseph has constructed a form that allows him to depict a deeply personal 
internal topography of legal practice that matches my own lawyer litigation 
experiences. These stories also match the private war stories of many other 
litigation attorneys I’ve known when they attempt to speak about their 
‘private practice’ of the law.235 
Less readily apparent is the truthfulness inherent in Kafka’s depiction of 
the law and legal processes, a reality recognized by Justice Kennedy and 
his assertion that Kafka’s legal world is very close to how many litigants in 
the United States’ various legal systems experience the law.236 Even as 
Joseph and Kafka strip away the layers of husk to reveal the kernels of 
truth in legal practice, it is not clear how that underlying reality could be 
depicted or fully theorized within the context of academic discourse. There 
are veins in the critical legal studies movement that may serve to explain 
and formalize elements of Joseph and Kafka, including the partial 
minimization of traditional sources of the law, the recognition that action 
and reaction are properly not conceived as entirely free but are to some 
extent circumstance dependent, and that the interweaving of legal and 
political issues is unavoidable. Yet, even in melding together these strains, 
there are material elements of both jurisprudential visions that are left on 
the outside. For instance, depicting law as power is only a partial 
explanation of how the various legal relationships in both Joseph and Kafka 
interact and fill the initial void of the law’s content. More fundamentally, if 
law as an abstract entity is largely lacking content, or at least of only 
secondary importance in legal proceedings, then legal power is itself only a 
derivative description of legal relationships which themselves are the 
primary ground of law. There is no law without application, and application 
by necessity needs subject and object. Even if critical legal studies could 
explain subsequent derivations from this initial relationship, it fails to 
provide any account for the existence of the basic principle. 
From this point, it is a short jaunt to recognizing the importance of 
texts such as Lawyerland and Kafka’s writings. Literary jurisprudence can 
fill potential gaps in legal thinking by depicting the development of law 
through narrative, and thereby cut closer to the truth than formal or 
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academic discourse. Beyond filling gaps in legal thinking, these visions 
may become increasingly important as legal thought as the practice of law 
evolves into the twenty-first century and traditional forms of jurisprudence 
are relegated to purely academic interest. If traditional sources of law are 
minimized and the interactions of relationships become even more 
important, it is unlikely that contemporary legal practice and thinking can 
be depicted in any sense but a narrative one. Beyond this, literature also has 
important things to say about the existing state of legal experience, as 
Kafka makes clear. Perspective is of the utmost importance, and viewing 
the law continually from a single vantage point within the system, as Judge 
Posner does, inevitably leaves a great deal of legal experience outside the 
circle of the law. A full understanding of the law must necessarily 
encompass divergent perspectives if it is to be true to reality. The 
possibilities of jurisprudential literature are thus bounded only by the exact 
nature of legal reality. Far from destroying law and literature as a 
discipline, Joseph and Kafka serve to increase its horizons by focusing on 
the philosophical and jurisprudential possibilities of literature. It is in this 
direction that law and literature should proceed in the coming decades. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has come to its conclusion and, accordingly, it is time to 
gauge what has hopefully been accomplished by its meanderings. First, it 
has offered a harmonious and complementary reading of two giants in the 
contemporary law and literature discourse, Franz Kafka and Lawrence 
Joseph. The works of these authors offer complementary perspectives of 
the legal system—Kafka’s from the point of view of the litigant, Joseph’s 
from within the system. Kafka’s vision seems absurd on its own and 
Joseph’s vision is chaotic in its own right, but read together their writings 
demonstrate the importance of subjective perceptions of the law and how 
those perceptions may color one’s experience of the legal system. When 
read in this light, it should also be apparent why Judge Posner’s assessment 
of Kafka must be rejected. The appearance of law in Kafka is simply that—
an appearance that is heavily dependent on the perspective that he utilizes 
in conveying his narratives. It is Justice Kennedy’s view of the importance 
of Kafka that prevails in this context, as he recognizes that the depiction is 
perspective-dependent. Law may be a system of rules, but that fact need 
not dictate exhaustively the experiences of those who come into contact 
with the law. However a judge may view the law from the bench, 
ostensibly interpreting clear legal texts and applying concrete legal rules, 
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the litigant may view such applications as arbitrary, capricious, and 
irrational. 
Second, this Article has attempted to extract a coherent jurisprudence 
from the foregoing complementary reading. Law takes its content only 
through its application, and this application is primarily a function of the 
relationships in the legal system: lawyer-client, prosecutor-defendant, 
judge-litigant, and so forth. These relationships sit at the base of the legal 
system, in Luban’s cellar, where the limits of its authority are teased out. 
Moving away from traditional conceptions of jurisprudence, Kafka and 
Joseph offer a realist, practical account of the nature and derivations of law 
in contemporary practice. 
Finally, in asserting that a literary jurisprudence is possible, this 
Article argues that this is the direction in which law and literature should 
progress. Literary jurisprudence offers a better opportunity to directly and 
truthfully address the nature of law in its twenty-first century 
manifestations. Moreover, the narrative form is likely to get one closer to 
the truth of legal experience than are the traditional approaches of academic 
jurisprudence. As in the description of Kafka’s and Joseph’s jurisprudence, 
the narrative form can offer competing perspectives on the same issue 
without contradicting itself. In this sense, literary jurisprudence, despite its 
fictional form, may offer a more realistic account of contemporary legal 
practice than academic writing, and thus provide a solid basis from which 
improvements in law could be proposed. 
This final point provides a single concluding observation. Schlag, at 
the conclusion of a jurisprudence class addressing Lawyerland, posed this 
question to his students: 
Well, so what is this class? On March 15, 2000, one morning during three 
years of law school, we had a class where we discussed Lawyerland. Then 
we went off to UCC or corps and ad-law and the like for another year and a 
half? Is that it? And where does Lawyerland fit into this jurisprudence 
class? Just a sliver of raw reality wedged between Law and Economics and 
Neo-pragmatism?237 
Schlag received no answers from his students, 238  but this Article has 
attempted to place Joseph along with Kafka, within the sphere of 
jurisprudence. Schlag himself offered an answer to the remainder of his 
query in concluding his Columbia Law Review essay: 
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Legal academics have some obligation to prepare law students for law 
practice. At a minimum, this would include not deluding or misleading 
them with highly romanticized or sanitized visions of law and lawyering. 
People who imagine that law is, in and of itself, a noble enterprise that 
elevates our moral community have a minimal obligation to warn law 
students that this imagined law—this law of beautiful souls—does not have 
much to do with contemporary American law practice. Beyond honoring 
such minimal disclosure requirements, one could, of course, go further and 
actually try to expose law students to some of the realities of law practice. 
But academics tend to shun the ugly sides of law—to the detriment of their 
students. Arguably, there is something ethically obtuse in sending law 
students out into lawyerland equipped with only a copy of Heracles’ Bow or 
Law’s Empire, miscellaneous ALI fragments, a few hundred statutes, ten 
thousand appellate cases, and a cheery graduation speech.239 
Kafka and Joseph can both provide a hard look into the real, and sometimes 
surreal, world of actual legal practice. Although neither claims to hold a 
magical key to understanding the law or legal practice, students familiar 
with their writings will undoubtedly be better prepared for the realities of 
the world to which they seek entrance. 
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